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The Motnent of Silence in Public Schools:
Valid Educational Activity or AtteIllpt to
Breach the Church---State Wall?
by James A. Helfman

P

roponents of school prayer realize that a constitutional amendment is needed to get specific
prayer into the nation's public schools,1
and such an amendment is strongly supported by nationalleaders.2 What is not
clear, however, is the status of the
"moment of silence" in public schools.
On April 2, 1984, the Supreme Court
heard oral argument in the case of Wallace v. Jaffree,3 dealing with the constitutionality of an Alabama statute calling
for moment of silence in Alabama public schools. 4 Hopefully, the Court will
issue a definitive ruling on the applicability of the three-prong Establishment
Clause testS as it applies to the burgeoning
moment of silence movement. 6
It is the purpose of this article to investigate the historical foundations of the
Establishment Clause as it has evolved

from constitutional formulation to the
present day, and to analyze the evolution
of case law with specific regard to the
growing controversy surrounding the
moment of silence in public schools. This
subject and the issues surrounding it are
of great concern to this writer, not just
because of my years as a public school
teacher but because of my firm belief that
prayers are the province of religious institutions and family, not the business of
school boards. 7
A full understanding of the Establishment Clause requires an examination of
the historical development of American
religious philosophy during the formative years of our republic. s There were
many evils that forced our ancestors to
flee their European homeland,9 and freedom of religion was a major factor in the
rapid settlement of the New W orld. 10

The right to worship as one pleased attracted displaced settlers from all nations
who were determined to exercise this
right upon arrival in the New World.l1
Unfortunately, however, some of the
groups which fled to this country to escape the religious persecution of Europe
tried to force their particular religious
beliefs upon other colonists. 12 Laws
authorizing the collection of tax monies
to support the government-favored
churches were allowed, and religious
bigotry and intolerance were widespread,
particularly towards non-Christian
religions .13
It is remarkable that the term "relig_
ion" is not defined anywhere in the Constitution. Indeed, the only reference to a
Supreme Being is in the date of the Constitution itself, i.e., "in the year of our
Lord."14 This lack of Constitutional de-
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finition has been a concern to courts and
commentators throughout the years,
since the Establishment Clause lends itself to any number of viable interpretations. 1s The resulting confusion is succinctly expressed by columnist George
Will:
The authors of the "establishment"
clause wanted to guarantee that
government action would be impartial among religions. They did
not intend to require that it be neutral between religion and secularism. Still less did they intend what
the Supreme Court has mandatedthat any law must have a "secular
legislative purpose and a primary
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion." 16
For the time being, however, the Establishment Clause controversy seems centered on viability of a moment of silence
in public schools.
Whenever religious activities become
involved with public education, the extent of governmental involvement is
measured by the three-pronged Establishment Clause test.!? The formulation
of this test began with the 1947 decision
of Everson v. Board of Education. 18 Despite
upholding the validity of using public
funds to transport children to parochial
schools, the Everson Court stated clearly
the constitutional parameters of the First
Amendment:
The "establishment of religion"
clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state
nor the Federal Government can
set up a church. Neither can pass
laws which aid one religion, aid all
religions, or prefer one religion
over another. Neither can force nor
influence a person to go or remain
away from church against his will
or force him to profess a belief or
disbelief in any religion. No person
can be punished for entertaining or
professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or
non-attendance. No tax in any
amount, large or small, can be levied
to support any religious activity or
institutions, whatever they may be
called, or whatever form they may
adopt to teach or practice religion.
Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can, openly or secretly,
participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and
vice versa. In the words ofJefferson,
the clause against establishment of
religion by law was intended to
erect a "wall of separation between

Church and State. "19
This definitional statement was repeated
the following year in McCollum v. Board
of Education. 20 By declaring release school
time for religious education unconstitutional, the McCollum Court showed it had
adopted a broad interpretation of Everson
and placed an obligation of neutrality on
government with respect to religion. 21
The "high and impregnable wall" mentioned by the McCollum Court developed
cracks four years later. In Zorach v. Clauson 22 the Court retreated from the broad
scope of the Everson-McCollum principle. 23 The Zorach Court stated that the
First Amendment "does not say that in
every and all respects there shall be separation of Church and State ... [it requires
only that] there shall be no concert or
union or dependency one on the other."24

Prayers are -the
province of religious
institutions and
family, not the
business of school
boards.
The refusal to extend the McCollum
decision to the similar facts ofZorach was
based on a subtle distinction between the
two cases. The Zorach Court found that
the difference between the school system
in McCollum and the school system in
Zorach was that the public school authorities in McCollum were deeply involved
in the religious-education programs while
the Zorach authorities were not. 2s The
Zorach decision was of even greater importance, however, because the Court
elaborated two religiously oriented reasons for its holding as well. The Zorach
Court said that (l) accommodation to
the spiritual needs of its citizens is an established American tradition; and (2)
not making such a concession would result in preference of atheists over believers.26 While this pro-religious logic
did not repudiate the Everson-McCollum
principle, greater tolerance for religious
activities was clearly implied. This new
tolerance produced a rash of seemingly
conflicting decisions 28 that served to distort the once definitive Everson pronouncement. By 1962, the Court realized
a new definition for Establishment Clause
analysis was needed.
Engel v. Vitale 29 provided the Supreme
Court with the opportunity to make a

definitive ruling regarding prayers in
public schools, and by ruling against a
state prayer the Court repaired, at least
temporarily, the cracked wall of the
church-state separation. In Engel, the
New York State Board of Regents had
composed a nondenominational prayer
that was recited by students prior to the
stmt of classes each day.30 In holding that
the use of this prayer violated the Establishment Clause, the Court revived the
Everson standard and stated flatly that
"each separate government in this
country should stay out of the business
of writing or sanctioning official
prayers. "31
The next year, a similar problem regarding prayer in the public schools faced
the Court in Abington School District v.
Schempp.32 Schempp involved the reading
of the Bible and a recitation of the Lord's
prayer as a part of a school's opening
exercises; it did not involve an official
prayer composed by the state or a state
agency. The Court, nevertheless, held
that this activity violated the Establishment Clause, affirming both its earlier
ruling in EngeP3 as well as the Everson
standard. The Schempp Court stated two
requirements which had to be met for a
statute to withstand Establishment Clause
scrutiny. The statute in question must
have: (1) a secular legislative purpose;
and (2) a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion. 34 As the
Court stated, "In the relationship between man and religion, the State is firmly
committed to a position of neutrality. ','35
Eight years later, the Supreme Court
formally announced the test for Establishment Clause analysis. In Lemon v.
Kurtzman 36 the Court articulated the
three-prong standard for Establishment
Clause analysis: (1) the statute in question must have a secular legislative purpose; (2) the statute's principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion and (3) the
statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion,37
Subsequent cases have reinforced the
validity of this test, however inconsistent
the results may be. 38
While the specifics of the three-pronged
test are firmly established, the exact scope
of its application is far from clear and is
subject to varying interpretations by judicial districts. As stated by Chief]ustice
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Burger in Kurtzman, "The line of separation, far from being a 'wall,' is a blurred,
indistinct, and variable barrier depending
on all the circumstances of a particular
relationship. "39 Perhaps the most succinct comment was made by Mr. Justice
White when he stated that "Establishment Clause cases are not easy; they stir
deep feelings, and [the Court is] divided
among ourselves, perhaps reflecting the
different views on this subject of the
people of this country. "40
The differing views of the people in
this country on the subject of the Establishment Clause are clearly demonstrated
in the moment of silence movement. 41 In
determining the applicability of the first
prong of the test to moment of silence
laws, i.e., that the statute in question have
a secular purpose, courts have looked to
the legislative history of the statute as
well as the face of the statute itself. In
Duffy v. Las Cruces Public Schools42 the
plain language of the statute supported
the Court's decision that the purpose of
the statute was to establish prayer in
public schools. 43 In determining the defendant's contention that the inclusion of
the words "contemplation" and "meditation" indicated the "neutral" intent of
the legislature, the Court said it was clear
that words were inserted "solely for the
purpose of attempting to disguise the
religious nature of the bill."44 In Beck v.
McElrath, the Court determined the
nonsecular purpose of the Tennessee
statute by first determining the practical
effect the language of the statute would
have. 45 The Court said:
In the abstract it is true that "meditation" and "reflection" upon personal beliefs can be viewed as carrying meanings that do not touch
upon religion. Individual terms
within a statute are not to be construed in a purely abstract sense or
in a vacuum, however. As all terms
in the statute are viewed together
and accorded reasonable meaning,
it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the legislative purpose was
advancement of religious exercises
in the classroom. Ordinary principles of statutory construction do
not comprehend the straining defendants would urge upon the
court. 46
This nonsecular conclusion was supported by the Court's review of the legislative
history of the bill, which revealed that
the intent in passing the bill was "to
establish prayer as a daily fixture in the
public schools of Tennessee."47
The second prong of the Establishment
Clause test, that the statute have a pri8-The Law Forum/Fall, '984

mary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, has generally been viewed
in practical terms based on the actual effect a moment of silence would have. The
Beck Court pointed out the prevailing
legal sentiment:
Unavoidably, students will understand that they are being encouraged not only to be silent, but
also to engage in religious exercises.
It cannot be seriously argued, and
certainly cannot be assured, that
nice distinctions concerning the
potential meaning of "meditation"
and "personal beliefs" will naturally arise in the minds of public
school students. 48

ttUnavoidably, students
will understand that
they are being
encouraged not only to
be silent, but also to
engage in religious
activities. "

One columnist was more direct in his belief that school children would, in practice, equate silence with prayer.
When you're eight years old and
all the kids around you bow their
heads, you bow your head. When
everyone is mumbling words, you
mumble words. When they pause
for a moment of silence, you do the
same. And you do it not because
you want to, but because you do
not want to make a spectacle of
yourself. What eight-year-old is
going to raise his or her hand and
say to the teacher, "I have a constitutional right to be excused and I
would like at this moment to do
so?"49
The third prong of the test, that the
statute will result in excessive government entanglement with religion, has
again been viewed by courts in the light
of practical application. A moment of
silence in school implies that teachers
will be responsible for supervising this
activity, a contingency the Supreme
Court has, in fact, already recognized. 50

The Beck Court noted that as teachers and
school officials perform their supervisory
tasks, "public funds," though small in
amount, are being used to promote a
religious exercise. 51 Other courts have
been more direct, stating flatly that "if the
state must engage in continuing administrative supervision of nonsecular activity,
church and state are excessively intertwined. "52 This entanglement would result even if the activity takes place before
the opening of the school day. 53
At present, the weight of authority in
state and federal courts clearly holds that
a state mandated "moment of silence" in
public schools is unconstitutional. However, it is inescapable that a moment of
silence is not per se unconstitutional,54
and a properly worded and enacted bill
may not violate the First Amendment. In
fact, many people feel that a properly
drafted moment of silence bill would be
an ideal solution to the current debate
between those who want a school prayer
amendment and those who do not. Their
logic goes as follows: If the moment of
silence statute is not upheld, it is likely
that the matter will be settled by the
adoption of a constitutional amendment
and this would invite the kind of religious
involvement that must be avoided. As
one periodical noted:
Those resisting the [moment of
silence] are bound to appear not as
defenders of freedom of conscience
but as doctrinaire secularists who
do not want the public school day
to be opened upon the transcendant even for a fleeting moment. 55
Such opinion would be regrettable and
uncalled for, but it serves to demonstrate
the confusion and discord that exists in
the area of prayer in the public school.
This writer looks forward to the
Supreme Court's ruling on Wallace v.
Jaffree. 56 While I feel strongly that a
moment of silence in school, no matter
how carefully and neutrally created by
legislature, is nothing more than an excuse to break down the wall of churchstate separation and institute prayer in
school, it cannot be denied that it is possible under the current Supreme Court
guidelines to have a constitutionally
permissible moment of silence in public
schools. As the Court stated in Schempp,
"the breach of neutrality that is today a
trickling stream may all too soon become
a raging torrent. "57 The moment of silence in public schools is such a breach.
Because the current three-prong test can
be circumvented by a moment of silence,
a new standard must be formulated and
implemented by the Court; Wallace v.
Jaffree provides the perfect vehicle.

m

Notes
1 A proposed amendment to the Constitution was narrowly defeated in this session
of Congress. The proposed amendment
provides: "Nothing in this Constitution
shall be construed to prohibit individual
or group prayer in public school or other
public institutions. No person shall be required by the United States or by any state
to participate in prayer."
2 President Reagan was quoted as saying:
"The amendment we'll propose will restore the right to pray .... Changing the
Constitution is a mammoth task. It should
never be easy. But in this case I believe we
can restore a freedom that our Constitution
was always meant to protect." N.Y. Times,
May 7, 1982, at B 10, col. 1.
3 705 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1983), argued, 52
U.S.L.W. 3719 (U.S. April 2, 1984)(No. 83812). A preliminary ruling on a peripheral
issue was reported but the full opinion of
the Court on the merits has not been published as of the date this article was submitted.
4 ALA. CODE §16-1-20.1 (1982). The law
reads as follows:
At the commencement of the first
class of each day in all grades in
pu blic schools, the teacher in charge
of the room in which each such class
is held may announce that a period
of silence not to exceed one minute
in duration shall be observed for
meditation or voluntary prayer, and
during any such period no other
activities shall be engaged in.
5 See infra note 36.
6 Many states have passed similar laws. See,
e.g., Md. S.2 (1982), proposed amendment
to MD. [EDUC.] CODE ANN. §7-104 (1978
and Supp. 1983); TENN. CODE ANN. §49-61004 (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. §18A: 36-4
(West 1982).
7 Thanks to James J. Kilpatrick for his expression of this religious precept. The Sun
(Baltimore), March 23, 1983, at A 9, col. 1.
8 Such a study is beyond the scope of this
article. For an in depth treatment of this
area, See Sky, The Establishment Clause,
The Congress, and the School: A Historical Perspective, 52 VA. L. REV. 1395 (1966).
9 For an excellent perspective on conditions
in Europe that encouraged immigration
to the New World, see Everson v. Board of
Education, 330 U.S.!, 8-9 (1947).
10 Comment, Accommodating Religion in
the Public Schools, 59 NEB. L. REV. 425,
428 (1982).
11 "The privilege of setting up one's own
kind of religion in the new country, and of
maintaining it there, made a strong appeal
to devoted groups." LOUIS B. WRIGHT,
THE CULTURAL LIFE OF THE AMERICAN
COLONIES, at 72 (1957).
12 "Let no one imagine, as school children
have sometimes been taught to believe, that
our ancestors came in search of 'religious
toleration.' Toleration was a concept that
few of them recognized or approved. What
they wanted was freedom from interference by opposing religious sects or unfriendly official authorities. Once firmly
in the saddle themselves, the sects that had
been persecuted in England became equally
zealous to root out heretics from their own
order." I d. at 72-73.
13 Even the enlightened colonial minds of the
day acknowledged this distinction. William
Penn, in his Frame of Government (1682)
welcomed to full rights all citizens of
Pennsylvania "who profess to believe in
Jesus Christ"; the Maryland colonial as-

sembly, in "An Act concerning Religion:
(1649)(generally referred to as the Toleration Act) provided toleration to those 'professing to believe in Jesus Christ' who did
not deny his divinity or the doctrine of
Trinity." A. Stokes & L. Pfeiffer. Church
and State in the United States, at 12, 18
(1964).
14 My thanks to Kenneth Lasson, Associate
Professor of Law at the University of Baltimore, for providing this interesting historical note.
15 See infra note 38.
16 The Sun (Baltimore), January 20, 1983, at
A 15, col. 1.
17 See infra note 36.
18 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
19Id. at 15-16.
20 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
21 "To hold that a state cannot consistently
with the First and Fourteenth Amendments
utilize its public school system to aid any
or all religious faiths or sects in the dissemination of their doctrines and ideals
does not, as counsel urge, manifest a governmental hostility to religion or religious
teachings. A manifestation of such hostility
would be at war with our national tradition as embodied in the First Amendment's
guarantee of the free exercise of religion.
For the First Amendment rests upon the
premise that both religion and government
can best work to achieve their lofty aims if
each is left free from the other within its
respective sphere. Or, as we said in the
Everson case, the First Amendment has
erected a wall between Church and State
which must be kept high and impregnable."
Id. at 211-212.
22343 U.S. 306 (1952)(holding the New York
City system of release time for religious
education constitutional).
23 In a quote he later came to regret, Justice
Douglas stated that "We are a religious
people whose institutions presuppose a
Supreme Being." Id. at 313.
24Id. at 312.
25 This distinction was further explained by
Justice Brennan in his concurring opinion
in Abington School District v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203 (1963), when he stated that the
"difference was that the McCollum program placed the religious instructor in the
public school classroom in precisely the
position of authority held by the regular
teachers of secular subjects, while the
Zorach program did not."
26Zorach. 343 U.S. at 313-14.
27 Despit~ the pro-religion language, the
Court specifically stated "We follow the
McCollum case." [d. at 315.
28 See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420 (1961 )(upholding Sunday dosing laws).
The state's purpose in enacting Sunday
Blue Laws, i.e., to provide a uniform day
of rest for its citizens, was valid despite the
fact the purpose "happens to coincide or
harmonize with the tenets of some or all
religions." I d. at 442.
29 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
30 The prayer read "Almighty God, we
acknowledge our dependence upon Thee,
and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our
parents, our teachers, and our Country."
Id. at 422.
31Id. at 435.
32 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
33 I d. at 225.
34Id. at 222.
35 Id. at 225-26.
36 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
37 [d. at 612-14.
continued on page 27

Quickee Offset
inc.

• Specializing in Xerox
Copies
• Regular Xeroxing
• Fabulous Xerox 9400
Duplicating
• The NEW Xerox
COLOR Copier
• Wedding Invitations
and Announcements
• Organization Newsletters,
Rule Books, Programs and
Tickets
• Fast Photo Offset,
Phototypesetti ng ,
Duplicating,
Printing & Bindery
Services
• Fine color printing

2310 N. Charles St.

(Customer Parking)
Baltimore, Md. 21218
• 467-5800

Fall, I984/The Law Forum-9

Moment of Silence
Notes continued from page 9

E.g., Committee for Public Education and
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
772-73 (l973)(holding a New York statute
providing building maintenance and repair funds to nonpublic schools and affording parents of non public school students tuition reimbursements and state
income 'tax deductions as violative of the
Establishment Clause); Roemer v. Board
of Public Works of Maryland, 426 U.S. 739,
748 (1976)(holding a Maryland statute
authorizing payment of state funds to any
private college, including religiously affiliated ones, so long as the funds were not
used for "sectarian purposes" as not violative of the Establishment Clause); Committee for Public Education and Religious
Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 653 (1980)
(holding a New York statute directing
payment to nonpub1ic schools of the costs
incurred by them in complying with statemandated requirements of testing, reporting, and record-keeping as not violative of
the Establishment Clause).
39 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
40 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980). He was joined in
this opinion by Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Stewart, Powell, and Rehnquist.
41 See supra note 6.
42 557 F. Supp. 1013, 1015 (D. N.M. 1983).
43 The bill in question reads as follows: "Each
local school board may authorize a period
of silence not to exceed one minute at the
beginning of the school day. This period
may be used for contemplation, meditation
or prayer, provided that silence is maintained and no activities are undertaken."
[d. at 1015.

38

[d.
548 F. Supp. 1161, (M.D. Tenn. 1982).
46 [d. at 1163.
47 The bill in question reads as follows: "At
the commencement of the first class of each
day in all grades in all public schools, the
teacher in charge of the room in which
44
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such class is held shall announce that a
period of silence not to exceed one minute
in duration shall be observed for meditation or prayer or personal beliefs and during any such period, silence shall be
maintained."
48 548 F. Supp. 1161, 1165, (M.D. Tenn. 1982).
49 Richard Cohen, No One is Laughing,
LEARNING, February 1982.
50 "[T]he very restrictions and surveillance
necessary to ensure that teachers play a
strict non-ideological role give rise to entanglement between church and state."
403 U.S. 602, 620-21 (1971).
51
548 F. Supp. 1161, 1165 (1982)(quoting
Abington School District v. Schempp,
374 U.S. at 220, [Douglas, J. concurring]).
52 Brandon v. Board of Education, 635 F.2d
971, 979 (2d Cir. 1980).
53 All that is required for church-state entanglement is that the supervised activity
takes place at a time "closely associated
with the school day ... (it is the State's)
compulsory education that draws the students to school whether or not the school
day has officially begun." Lubbock v.
Lubbock, 669 F.2d 1038, 1046 (5th Cir. 1982).
54 Justice Brennan, in Abington School District v. Schempp, states that "it has not been
shown that readings from the speeches and
messages of great Americans, for example,
or from the documents of our heritage of
liberty, daily recitation of the Pledge of
Allegiance, or even the observance of a
moment of reverant silence at the opening
of class, may not adequately serve the solely
secular purposes of the devotional activities
without jeopardizing either the religious
liberties of any member of the community
or the proper degree of separation." 374
U.S. 203, 281 (l963)(emphasis added).
55 A Moment of Silence, AMERICA, November
13, 1982, p. 283.
56 See supra note 3.
57 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963).
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